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Cautions on the Use of Economics Experiments in Law
by
KATHRYN ZEILER∗
The recent move to import empirical results into law and policymaking
have introduced challenges related to drawing proper inferences from
quantitative studies. The purpose of this essay is to elaborate on three
specific cautions on the use of economics experiment results. First,
critiques of experiment designs based on external and ecological validity
are often misplaced. Second, some legal scholars have fallen into the
problematic habit of applying results from experiments directly to law
and policy rather than applying well-supported theories. Third, the
divergent purposes behind economics studies and legal scholarship give
rise, in part, to problematic cherry picking of experimental studies by
legal scholars. (JEL: B41, C90, K00)

1 Introduction
The field of law and economics incorporates and develops economic theory as
well as empirical results from field studies and laboratory experiments to both
descriptively and normatively analyze law. Widespread application of economic
theory to law got off the ground well before legal scholars began importing and
generating empirical studies. In recent year, however, the availability of field
data, the growth of experimental economics as a field and the increased
popularity of interdisciplinarity in legal scholarship have led to widespread
importation of economics studies that report the results of quantitative analyses
pertaining to law.
The recent development of the field of empirical legal studies and the
move to import empirical results into legal scholarship and policymaking have
introduced challenges related to drawing proper inferences from quantitative
studies. The purpose of this essay is to explore common misuses of quantitative
results from economics experiments. While many challenges arise in the
application of experimental economics to law, I focus on three. First, I argue that
critiques of experiment designs by legal scholars and policymakers based on
notions of external and ecological validity are not only misplaced but are
unproductive. Correct evaluation of experiments requires appreciation for the
reasons why we conduct them: to study basic economic principles. A good
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experiment design does not mimic reality; rather, it is guided by conditions of
theories the experiment is designed to test.
Second, rather than applying theories that tend to be well supported by
data produced in the laboratory, commentators sometimes apply experiment
results directly to law and policy. This misuse is problematic for a variety of
reasons. First, this misapplication of experiments, in part, drives faulty critiques
of experiments grounded in notions of external validity. Second, when we apply
results rather than theories, our focus is easily shifted toward faulty critiques of
experiment designs and away from constructive criticism directed toward
assumptions upon which tested theories are based. Third, applying results rather
than theory takes our eye off the ball. We lose sight of the fact that we should
instead apply theories that are well supported by a body of evidence. Assessing
how well a theory is supported by the data requires us to be concerned not only
with one or a small handful of studies but rather with the body of evidence that
offers broader lessons about the robustness and accuracy of basic principles
comprising the foundation of theories. Finally, by focusing on results rather than
theory, we sometimes fail to notice which theories are best supported by the
evidence as a whole and which questions remain unsettled.
The third common misuse is triggered by the divergent purposes behind
economics studies and legal scholarship. The branch of economics that produces
the type of experimental studies I discuss here is driven by the desire to develop
robust and accurate descriptive models of behavior. Legal scholarship, on the
other hand, is largely geared toward the development of policy prescriptions.
This tension often leads to cherry picking from a large body of evidence that
often leaves many questions unanswered. Cherry picking to support one’s
predetermined stance leads to unhelpful and often misleading representations of
the science.
This essay is organized as follows. Part 2 describes the role of economic
experiments in the science of economics. The pros and cons of field studies and
laboratory experiments are discussed. With this as background I argue that the
most useful experiments are often those that substantially deviate from complex
settings that exist outside the laboratory. Part 3 discusses each of the three
common misuses in turn. The concluding section offers a few suggestions for
reducing the frequency of these misuses.
2 The Purpose Behind Experiments
The field of economics progresses through application of the scientific method.
Economists observe phenomena they wish to explain or predict. Theoretical
models are then developed to illuminate and explore potential drivers of observed
outcomes or behavior. The models generate predictions that can be tested using
data from a source other than the one from which the original observation was
made. When data do not comport with a model’s predictions, features of the datagenerating process are examined for clues about how to update the theory to
enhance its generalizability. Revised theoretical models generate different and
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often more refined predictions, which are again tested using data.1 The goal of
this cyclical process is to develop robust, general theories that can be applied to
study and improve health care markets, labor markets, international trade
relations, and regulatory regimes, to name just a few.2
Economists generally use data generated either in the field or using
laboratory experiments, and more recently using experiments conducted in the
field (HARRISON AND LIST [2004]). Each data source comes with advantages and
disadvantages. Field data, as its name suggests, is generated in the environment
in which the theory eventually will be applied. Thus the data reflect the influence
of factors beyond those the theory focuses on. This can be useful when it comes
to deciding whether and how to apply the theory to make policy. On the other
hand, the presence of other factors that might vary across units (e.g., states)
and/or time, sometimes contemporaneously with the factor of interest, give rise to
challenges when attempting to isolate and measure the impact of the factor of
interest. This is especially troublesome when changes in the other factors are, in
fact, correlated with changes in the factor of interest.
In some cases studying principles and testing theories in the field is
impossible (ARLEN AND TALLEY [2008]). If confounds cannot be controlled or
key variables cannot be measured in the field, empiricists often resort to the
laboratory. Laboratory environments provide opportunities to implement controls
not available in the field. For example, random assignment to treatment and
control groups, often impossible in the field, is easily achieved in the lab
(HARRISON AND LIST [2004]). In addition, the controlled environment allows for
singular changes to the procedures from treatment to treatment, which allow for
reliable identification of the impacts of the changes.
Economists generally conduct experiments either to study the
fundamental principles of economics that are used to build theoretical models or
to test predictions of basic theories developed using these fundamental principles
(KAGEL AND ROTH [1995]). For example, laboratory environments are generated
to test levels of risk aversion and loss aversion under a variety of condition. The
lab is also a useful setting for testing the impacts of changes in information on
behavior and the robustness and contours of price theory.
When designing experiments to study principles or to test theories,
experimentalists necessarily abstract from reality. Abstraction is required to
control for alternative explanations and to measure variables impossible to
measure in the field, among other reasons. For example, consider experiments
conducted to test theories designed to explain observed gaps between willingness
to pay and willingness to accept, often referred to as the endowment effect
(KAHNEMAN, KNETSCH AND THALER [1990]). Experiments designed to test
theories related to loss aversion and reference-dependent preferences can control
1

For more nuanced discussions of the application of the scientific method in economics,
see PLOTT AND SMITH [2008], GUALA [2005], SAMUELSON [2005], CRAWFORD [1997]
and ROTH [1988]. SMITH [2002] summarizes the scientific method but takes issue with
the idealized version of how experiment results relate to theory.
2
It’s important to note that experiments are employed not only to test theories. They are
also used, for example, to study how individuals operate under a particular set of
conditions (PLOTT [2001]) or to refine existing theories (ARLEN AND TALLEY [2008]).
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for alternative explanations in a variety of ways. By limiting the time subjects
spend with the good, the design can minimize the impacts of attachment on one’s
willingness to accept. Similarly, by making it virtually costless to trade, the
design can eliminate or significantly reduce the impacts of transaction costs on
individuals’ willingness to trade. It is also necessary to abstract from reality to
measure individuals’ valuations as buyers and sellers. Testing the theory requires
measuring the most buyers would be willing to pay and the least sellers would be
willing to accept to give up the endowed good. These variables are not easily
measureable in the field for obvious reasons. It turns out that reliably measuring
them in the lab is not straightforward; thus, experimenters use special
mechanisms designed to provide incentives to announce true valuations. Of
course, these mechanisms are rarely if ever used in actual markets. Despite the
abstraction, these experiments are useful for testing the basic principles of
reference dependence and loss aversion.
3 Common Misuses of Economics Experiments
With an understanding of the purpose behind economics experiments,
identification of the misuses of economics experiments in legal scholarship and
policy analyses is possible. This part summarizes cautions against three common
misuses of experimental studies: faulty critiques grounded in external and
ecological validity, direct application of experiment results rather than well
supported theories and cherry picking of single or small handfuls of studies from
larger, more informative experimental literatures.
3.1 Faulty Critiques of Experiments
The conventional wisdom in the field of law and economics (and in some cases
the fields of economics (LEVITT AND LIST [2006]) and political science (BASSI ET
AL. [2006])) seems to be that experiments are useful only to the extent they are
externally valid. An experiment’s results are externally valid if one is able to
draw valid causal inferences from them that can be applied generally (SCHRAM
[2005]). The concept of ecological validity captures a closely related idea.
Ecological validity is satisfied when an experiment’s design sufficiently
resembles the real world (SCHMUCKLER [2001]).
Critiques of this kind are forwarded both in the economics literature and
in the law literature. For example, LIST AND LEVITT [2006, abstract] question
“whether behavior inside the laboratory is a good indicator of behavior outside
the laboratory.” SUNSTEIN AND THALER [2003, 1168-1169], after listing results
from several experimental studies, concede that “[i]t is possible to raise questions
about some of these findings and to think that people may do a better job of
choosing in the real world than they do in the laboratory.” KELMAN [1985, p.
1042] challenges the applicability of results from an experiment studying dispute
resolution described by HOFFMAN AND SPITZER’S [1985] by arguing that “[i]n a
real world nuisance dispute, the contract settlement would by no means be as
straightforward” as the one generated by the experiment design. KOROBKIN
[2006, p. 281] discusses the issue more generally: “The disadvantage of
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[experimental economics] approaches is that they always raise the question of
‘external validity’…that is,…behavior empirically documented in a particular
laboratory setting may or may not occur in the highly contextual, real world
circumstances of interest to lawyers and other dispute resolution practitioners.”
While it’s often important to evaluate the external validity of experiments
designed to study potential impacts of policy changes, this criterion is often
misapplied to experiments designed to test fundamental principles of economics
(PLOTT [1982, 2001]).3 Plott takes issue with describing experiments as
“external.” He argues that the framing of experiments as somehow "external" is
misleading. Indeed, experiments occur in the “real world.” While experiment
designs often ask individuals to make decisions and take actions in simplified
settings, they remain part of worldly reality. There is no "out there." Experiments,
the argument goes, might be more usefully distinguished as occurring in simple
settings as opposed to more complex settings that characterize the field. The
recognition that theories bridge the simple settings of experiments and the more
complex settings found in the field illuminates the usefulness of working in these
simple settings (PLOTT [2001]).
The notion of "validity" also seems misplaced when it comes to
evaluating the usefulness of experiments. Causal relationships posited by theory
are not classified as valid or invalid. Validity is outside the realm of the scientific
method. Rather, we gain confidence in theories by evaluating their reliability (or
robustness). When a theory is supported by data derived from a variety of simple
contexts, we’re more inclined to conclude it operates in complex settings.
Arguments regarding the inapplicability of the concept of external
validity to experiments are brought into sharper focus by recalling the purpose
behind experimental studies. As discussed, experiments are employed to explore
fundamental economic principles and test predictions of basic economic models
that incorporate these basic principles. Simple settings allow us to rule out
alternative explanations and identify the effects of changes in the treatment
variable. Changes in outcomes or behavior arising from simple changes in the
variable of interest either support or reject the basic principles or theories under
examination. Once we gain confidence in the basic principles, we can begin to
build more complex theories to account for additional features present in
complex settings that might impact behavior or outcomes.
In this way, theory acts as a bridge between the simple settings in
experiments and more complex settings. Studying behavior in simple settings
allows us to gain confidence in the basic principles we use as building blocks in
more complex models. If we have reason to believe the predictions will differ
when we move from a simple setting to more complex settings, our aim should
be to update the theory to account for the features of concern. Once the theory
has been updated, we can test its predictions in the laboratory or using field data.
As the theory begins to take into account more and more features of concern, we
can test its predictions using data from the field. Without initial confidence in the
3

While some accept this claim (e.g., ARLEN AND TALLEY [2008], p. xxxvii), at least in
the context of testing the predictions of unitary-process models, others disagree (e.g.,
GUALA [2005], Ch. 7).
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basic principles, however, attempting to develop more complex theories is to put
the cart before the horse.
In addition to studying fundamental economic principles and testing
predictions derived from theory, economists sometimes conduct experiments to
study experimental methods or to investigate how some policy change might
impact behavior or outcomes in practice (KAGEL AND ROTH [1995], PLOTT
[2001]). With respect to the latter, the experiment design is driven in large part by
important features of the naturally occurring environment. For example, if one is
interested in studying the impact of framing in a particular setting—e.g.,
computation of damages by juries—the experimental setting should be designed
to take into account important features of the damages computation process that
might impact outcomes (MCCAFFERY, KAHNEMAN AND SPITZER [1995]).4 Of
course, designing an experiment that includes all the important features of
naturally occurring, complex settings is impossible. Thus, even the results from
experiments specifically designed to study actual policy changes cannot be
directly applied. The results will help us gain confidence in theories, which can
be useful in designing policy (PLOTT [2001]).
Understanding the purpose behind experiments illuminates why the
concept of external validity is unhelpful. It also demonstrates the fundamental
flaw in design critiques based on how well they mimic reality. So, how does one
evaluate experiment designs? The answer to this question also follows from the
purpose behind experimenting: to test fundamental principles and basic theories.
To do this well, experiment designs should satisfy a number of properties. First,
the features of the experiment design must comport with the conditions required
for the theory to apply. For example, if the model assumes an individual is
endowed with a particular good, the experiment design must ensure that subjects
understand their relationship to the good. Likewise, if the theory assumes that
certain information is common knowledge, all subjects must have access to the
information prior to making decisions. In addition, the experiment design must
implement controls that rule out alternative explanations (GUALA [2005, chapter
5]). It must also draw a large enough sample from the subject pool to achieve
sufficient statistical power to identify the particular effects of interest, if they
exist. While this short list of sound design features is not exhaustive, it provides a
starting point for proper critiques of experiment designs.
Especially useful designs develop environments that allow for the testing
of opposing predictions from competing theories.5 For example, we might
wonder whether gaps in willingness to pay and willingness to accept are due to
wealth effects or to special features of preferences (i.e., reference-dependence
and loss aversion) (COURSEY ET AL. [1987], KNETSCH AND SINDEN [1987],
FRANCIOSI ET AL. [1992]). To explore these theories, we can design an
4

Other examples include experiments conducted to study airport access
(GRETHER ET. AL [1979]), natural gas pipeline regulation (PLOTT [1988]), optimal
spectrum auctions (SALMON AND PLOTT [2004]) and pollution emission allowances
(CASON [2008]).
5
“[T]he policy implications of a theory’s evident refutation are elusive in the absence of
a plausible, falsifiable alternative theoretical account that is more consistent with
observed data.” (ARLEN AND TALLEY [2008]).
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experiment with two treatments: one that creates wealth effects and one that
eliminates wealth effects (i.e., provides buyers with cash roughly equal to the
value of the good provided to sellers). Both treatments should control for
alternative explanations (e.g., transaction costs). If gaps remain when wealth
effects are eliminated, the data support the theory positing particular features of
preferences. On the other hand, if gaps disappear in the absence of wealth effects,
then we can conclude that the data support the wealth effects conjecture.
Designing an experiment to test completing theories avoids the dilemma that
arises when data collected to test a single theory ends up rejecting the theory.
Failing to appreciate the scientific purpose behind experiments leads to a
second misuse of experiments: direct application of experiment results in
normative arguments. The next section cautions against this misuse and suggests
a more helpful way to incorporate experiment results into normative arguments.
3.2 Application of Economics Experiments in Policy
Understanding the purpose behind economics experiments not only helps in
understanding how to critique them but it is also useful in better understanding
how to apply what we learn from experiments. Figure 1 illustrates the
relationship between principles, experiment results and policy.
Figure 1
Proper Use of Experiment Results

principles

predictions

experiment
results

model

policy

The scientific method takes us from principles to predictions to
experiment results and back again. As discussed, the goal of this cyclical process
is to develop a set of fundamental principles that eventually will comprise the
foundations of more complex theories. Replicating reported results and testing
whether principles hold up under a variety of conditions helps to shore up
confidence that the principles are generally valid. The more confidence we have
in the fundamental principles, the more willing we should be to incorporate them
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into complex models. The complex models, then, generate predictions and
general institutions about behavior and outcomes under a set of assumptions.
Finally, these predictions and intuitions can be incorporated into policy
analyses—both descriptive and normative.
Actual applications of economics experiment results, however, oftentimes
proceeds along a different route. Figure 2 illustrates how experiment results are
sometimes used in policy analysis. Overlooking the relationship between
experiment results and theory, legal commentators often interpret experiment
results—sometimes from just one or two experimental studies—as demonstrating
the proven existence of some general feature of individual preferences or
inclinations.
Figure 2
Common Misuse of Experiment Results

principles

experiment
results

prediction

policy

The legal literature is rife with examples of this misuse of experiment
results. Rather than focus on the abundance, however, it will be helpful here to
select one example—SUNSTEIN AND THALER’S [2003, p. 1168] application of
results reported by GRETHER [1980]—to illustrate the negative consequences of
moving directly from results to policy. Grether concludes that decisions under
uncertainty tend not to comport with predictions of Bayes’ rule. Sunstein and
Thaler cite this result to support the claim that “[p]eople fail to make forecasts
that are consistent with Bayes’ rule.”6 They go on to argue that this result, along
with others that run counter to predictions derived from neo-classical models,
justify the adoption of what they refer to as “libertarian paternalism.”
The natural question to ask at this point is: what’s so bad about direct
application of results to policy? The distinction illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 is
important for several reasons. First, the direct application of experiment results to
policy analyses is, in part, what drives faulty critiques of experiment designs
grounded in ecological or external validity. Moving directly from experiment
results to policy naturally raises the question of whether the results are useful for
policy given the experiment design abstractions—why would we expect
individuals participating in markets to act similarly to the subjects in Grether’s
simple experiment? By applying theory rather than results and recognizing the
proper role of experiments in the development of general theories, our critiques
6

It’s interesting to note that, while Grether also found some evidence that experienced
subjects deciding under financial incentives act more like Bayesians, Sunstein and
Thaler do not address this important nuance.
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of experiments shift to more useful questions about whether the experiment is
sufficiently well designed to properly test the theory.
Second, the application of results directly to policy misdirects attention
toward experiment designs and away from the development of useful theories.
When we directly apply experiment results, our focus is on analyzing how the
experiment design differs from reality, and whether and how these differences
matter. By recognizing that theories rather than experiment results are applied in
policy analyses, we can engage in a more productive process of developing
robust and useful theories that can be applied in policy analyses. In particular,
shifting our focus to the application of theories compels us to ask whether the
theory is detailed enough for policy application. If an important feature of the real
world is missing from the model, the next step should be to update the theory (as
opposed to modifying the experiment design to better align it with the “real
world”). This feedback loop between policy analysis and theory development can
push theorists to modify theoretical models in useful ways.
Third, when we apply results from one or a small handful of studies, we
lose sight of the fact that theories are best applied only when they are well
supported by a body of experimental evidence. Translation of lessons from the
field of economics into the normative realm is most productive and least risky
when a theory’s predictions comport with a substantial portion of applicable
observed phenomena—both in the laboratory and in the field. When we apply
results rather than theory, it’s easy to mistakenly draw conclusions that do not
follow from an examination of the larger literature. As a general matter, it’s
important to apply theories rather than results from particular experiments
because the latter can easily lead us to draw inferences from non-robust results
produced by one or a small handful of experiments.
Fourth, when we apply results rather than theory and apply one or a small
handful of results, we often fail even to consider theoretical explanations for the
observed phenomenon. Moving directly from results to policy compels us either
to ignore possible explanations for the results or to assume some explanation that
may or may not be supported by the larger literature. For example, consider
observed behavior in ultimatum games, in which the proposer receives some
amount and offers a split to the responder.7 The split is effectuated unless the
responder rejects the offer, in which case both players get nothing. Experimenters
widely report that proposers offer much more to responders, even though the
game theoretic solution predicts tiny offers. A common offer is half the pie. If we
were to apply this result directly in policy analysis, we might be compelled to
conclude that notions of fairness influence proposers. A large body of
experimental evidence, however, studies whether proposers instead are reacting
to fears of punishment by offended responders (KAGEL AND ROTH [1995, pp.
270-274]). Clearly, these very different theories might lead to opposite policy
implications. Finally, even when we recognize the theory best supported by the
data, if we apply the results from just one experiment, we misrepresent, in some
7

For a discussion of ultimatum games and findings from experiments testing theories
attempting to explain proposer and responder behavior, see KAGEL AND ROTH [1995, pp.
258-292], HOFFMAN, MCCABE AND SMITH [2008] and J. KEITH MURNIGHAN [2008].
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cases, the broader understanding of basic economic principles the body of
relevant literature provides.
Sunstein and Thaler’s use of Grether’s results to support the claim that
regulations are necessary to nudge those who are likely to make suboptimal
decisions toward correct choices provides an illustration of the dangers. First, it
demonstrates a failure to account for what might be driving Grether’s results. In
other words, it applies experiment results rather than theory. It certainly might be
that individuals suffer from cognitive limitations that hinder their ability to reach
optimal outcomes. On the other hand, it’s possible that individuals are perfectly
capable of deciding what’s in their best interest, and the standard model of
Bayesian updating rejected by Grether’s results simply makes invalid
assumptions about individual preferences. Without knowing more about what
might be driving Grether’s results, developing effective policy is difficult.
Multiple theories might be observationally equivalent but might lead to very
different policy recommendations. Sunstein and Thaler seem to suggest that the
results support the claim that cognitive limitations preclude individuals from
making the right choices. ANDERSON AND HOLT (1997), however, describe
several alternative explanations for deviations from rational Bayesian updating
(in the context of information cascades), including a preference for the status quo
and the possibility that individuals derive utility from herding together.
Alternatively they might be adverse to the risk of standing alone. Understanding
which of these conjectures accounts for the observed phenomenon clearly is
important when it comes to implementing effective policy. Policy is able to steer
individuals in the “right” direction only if we understand in which direction to
head and how to get there.
Second, the single citation to Grether’s nearly thirty-year-old results
ignores the vast literature on the question whether and how well individuals
Bayesian update.8 In fact, experimentalists have developed a substantial literature
focused on explanations behind deviations from models relying on Bayesian
updating. The literature has attempted to investigate myriad explanations for such
deviations, including status quo bias, herding preferences, confirmatory bias
(DAVE AND WOLFE, 2003), and differences in the way the problem is presented
(GIGERENZER AND HOFFRAGE, 1995), among others. Only when we examine the
literature as a whole will we get a sense of which theory is best supported by the
data, or whether the explanation is an open question. Again, until we have a sense
of what drives behavior we observe in the laboratory, forwarding normative
positions and designing policy prescriptions become difficult at best and
ineffective at worst.
For the reasons discussed, legal commentators and others engaged in
policy analysis should take care to import well-supported theories into their
analyses rather than directly applying experiment results. This adjustment will
help to refocus critiques from whether experiment designs look sufficiently like
8

A good place to start might be Grether’s more recent work, finding that, while
individuals tend to use a variety of decisions rules when making decisions under
uncertainty, they are most likely to use Bayes’ Rule, especially when they are paid based
on outcomes (EL-GAMAL AND GRETHER [1995]).
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the “real world” to whether the theories being tested (and applied) include the
relevant features of the environments in which they will be applied. Focusing on
the theory’s shortcomings will help to push the theoretical models forward to
make them more useful in the policy realm. Finally, by applying theory rather
than experiment results, we’re less inclined to draw overly broad conclusions
from one experimental study, or a small handful of studies, and to negligent
lessons from the larger literature about what drives observed behavior.
Given the benefits derived from shifting focus from the results to basic
economic principles and theories, why do legal commentators so often directly
apply results? Furthermore, why do they apply results from just one study or a
small handful of studies when ignoring the larger literature substantially hinders
our understanding of the basic principles and observed phenomena? The
following section discusses a third caution on a common use of economics
experiments in legal scholarship—cherry picking only those studies that support
some pre-determined position from among a larger body of research, a portion of
which reports results that contradict or challenge the author’s arguments. It also
offers a possible (partial) explanation beyond mere misunderstanding of the role
of experiments in the science of economics.
3.3 The Leap from Descriptive to Normative
A third caution on the use of economics experiments, cherry picking, stems in
part from the divergent purposes behind economics studies and legal
commentary. While the field of economics is comprised of two distinct branches
of analysis—one descriptive and one normative—the type of experiments I focus
on here are associated most closely with the descriptive side of the fence.
Specifically, these experiments are conducted for the purpose of studying basic
principles that eventually get plugged into larger models that attempt to model
decision-making under a variety of conditions. The main goal of the descriptive
enterprise is to develop a set of models that generate robust and accurate
predictions. Developing robust models requires us to test predictions in a variety
of settings. By incorporating what we learn from experiments that test the
boundaries of theories, we are able to enhance the robustness of theories.
In contrast, legal commentary is driven largely by normative concerns.9
For example, doctrinal scholarship, while sometimes generated to explain and
analyze judicial decisions or other types of legal rules, often criticizes the
structure of law. Critiques of judicial decisions more often than not include
proposals to change the law. Some proposals recommend substituting one
doctrinal test for another. For example, CALABRESI’S [1980] famous analysis of
9

See e.g., RUBIN [1988] (“When viewed as an academic discourse, the most distinctive
feature of standard legal scholarship is its prescriptive voice, its consciously declared
desire to improve the performance of legal decision-makers.”); SCHLAG [1991] (“The
rhetorical script of normative legal thought is already written, the social scene is already
set and play after play, article after article, year after year, normative legal thought
requires you to choose: "What should we do? Where should we go?" We are free, but we
must choose…”).
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accident law argues that, in addition to reducing losses from accidents, we should
structure tort law to reduce the costs of precautions. Legal scholars also critique
policy making more generally. In this vein, BRONSTEEN, BUCCAFUSCO AND
MASUR [2009] argue for replacing cost-benefit analysis with well-being analysis
as policymakers’ core analytical tool. Legislative action is a target as well. One
example comes from HUSAK’S (2008) recently published book, which argues that
states should decriminalize much of the conduct currently characterized by the
law as criminal.
This tension between the main goals of the descriptive branch of
economics and legal commentary gives rise, in part, to a third category of misuse
of economics experiments—cherry picking from a body of experimental results.
The economics literature devoted to model building and testing is characterized
by competing theories and (oftentimes) contradictory results that have yet to be
reconciled. It is also common for methodologists to challenge experiment
designs, calling into question controls, measurement techniques and other design
issues. The methodology often naturally produces a set of results reported in a
series of papers, some of which support a particular normative position and some
of which can be employed in arguments countering it. In fact, much is unsettled.
Rather than providing an objective assessment of the economics landscape,
however, legal scholars sometimes report only those results that support their
forwarded policy positions, which are often chosen not based on an objective
assessment of potential consequences but rather to forward a particular set of
values or predetermined policy objectives (e.g., increasing access to health care,
lengthening jail sentences for convicted criminals, reducing auto emissions,
addressing global warming, etc.). While this misuse is not unique to experiments
(i.e., legal scholars often cherry pick from field studies and theoretical results)
cherry picking from bodies of economics experiments is quite common in legal
scholarship.
Rather than list a set of examples, I’ll drive home the point by sharing a
colleague’s recent description of advice he received from a prominent legal
scholar and mentor, who contributes regularly to the field of normative legal
scholarship and regularly testifies in front of Congress. On the use of empirical
results, the mentor advised viewing the chosen policy proposal as a “Christmas
tree.” Empirical results, including those generated by economics experiments,
should be considered mere “ornaments,” meant to dress up the tree. Under this
paradigm, the legal scholar is to locate and report only the “prettiest” empirical
results and to leave the “ugly” ones in the attic, hoping no one will notice them.
The danger, of course, is that policy prescriptions grounded in partial and/or
mischaracterized findings from economics, if adopted, could lead to unintended
negative consequences.
One possible response to the flagging of cherry picking as a problem is to
argue that we should not be concerned about this because, when legal scholars
leave out important experimental results, others will find them and bring them to
light. Despite this sometimes-effective monitoring device, cherry picking remains
problematic for at least three reasons. First, the language used to present the
results often implies that the commentator is describing the science in a neutral or
objective way (e.g., “social science research has revealed that X is true….”).
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Readers, many of whom are unfamiliar with the economics literature, often are
unaware that the description of the science is incomplete or that caveats apply.
They simply take the description at face value. Second, the vast majority of
published legal scholarship is not peer-reviewed. Therefore, experts are rarely
called upon to screen articles before they go into print. Unless the law student
editor has expertise in economics, descriptions of the state of the science are
accepted as is. Third, scholars have little incentive to correct the record. Even
when incomplete descriptions are spotted, corrections are not encouraged by the
academic reward system. When it comes to policymaking (to the extent legal
scholarship influences policy), mechanisms like notice and comment periods
invite corrections, although these clearly are not full proof.
4 Conclusion
Misuses of economics experiments in legal scholarship and policy analysis are
driven by a variety of factors. Faulty critiques grounded in external or ecological
validity and direct application of results rather than well-supported theories likely
are due, at least in part, to a lack of appreciation for or understanding of the
fundamental purpose behind economics experiments. A better understanding of
the features of a sound economics experiment makes clear why experimentalists
rightly do not strive to design experiments to mimic more complex settings that
exist outside the laboratory. In addition, a better understanding of the role of
experiments in the descriptive branch of economics helps clarify why directly
applying experiment results rather than well-supported theories in legal analysis
is problematic. Bringing to light the role of experiments in the field of economics
likely will lead to fewer misuses of these types.
Addressing the third misuse is less straightforward. Cherry picking likely
arises in part from a lack of appreciation of the fact that large bodies of evidence
often are produced to study basic economics principles. Developing complete
reviews of experimental literatures and synthesizing a set of results to draw
conclusions regarding which theories best organize the data can be difficult,
especially for those not trained in the methods. Increased attention to the inherent
complexities of the science of economics can reduce the frequency of inadvertent
cherry picking.
Other factors, however, drive cherry picking. The normative nature of
legal scholarship naturally leads to attempts to highlight results that support the
author’s pre-determined policy prescription or proposed changes to the law.
While we sometimes can rely on opponents to bring to light contradictory
evidence, this is not a fail-safe. Certainly requiring peer-review of legal
scholarship would help. Some law review editorial boards have been seeking
reviews from faculty with expertise, although this solution comes with severe
limitations (e.g., experts reside on a limited number of faculties, law faculty have
few incentives to take on this time-consuming task, law students are not driven
by reputation effects that impose pressure on journal editors in other fields who
are members of the field). Perhaps the best we can do under the circumstances is
to warn those who turn to legal scholarship for objective assessments of whether
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and how lessons from economics experiments can be applied in legal analyses to
be on the lookout for less-than-objective applications of experiments.
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